Opposition leader Juan Guaid\u00f3\u2019s fall from grace symbolizes the failure of U.S. and opposition tactics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This spring, the Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaid\u00f3 delivered a solemn address to the international press in Miami, Florida. Claiming his life was in danger, Guaid\u00f3 announced that he fled Venezuela to escape persecution and rally the world against the government of President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In bold strokes, he argued that Maduro constitutes a threat<\/a> to \u201cthe entire world,\u201d declaring that Russian officials recently \u201cgave [the president] instructions\u201d to subvert hemispheric security. \u201cWe cannot allow Russia to also continue destabilizing the American continent,\u201d he emphasized, while blaming the foreign superpower for the region\u2019s immigration crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ridiculing his press conference, foreign political analysts and pundits<\/a> portrayed Guaid\u00f3\u2019s speech as a sad attempt to increase his visibility after opposition leaders dissolved his \u201cinterim government\u201d in December.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet his emphasis on foreign interventionism was ironically appropriate. This May, the Center for Economic and Policy Research published a seminal study<\/a> concluding that Western sanctions are heavily responsible for Venezuela\u2019s humanitarian crisis. The report partly attributes rising mortality rates, medicine shortages, and a 78 percent decrease<\/a> in food imports between 2012 and 2020 to United States policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In many ways, Guaid\u00f3\u2019s flight to Miami signifies the failure of U.S. strategy in Venezuela. For more than two decades, Washington has intervened in Venezuelan society to sap support for the revolution that former President Hugo Ch\u00e1vez initiated. Yet instead, its policies have proven contradictory, pushing the opposition toward extremism, entrenching chavismo and accelerating an economic meltdown that now drives Venezuelans to the U.S. border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Toxic Allies<\/p>\n\n\n\n Current tensions trace back to 1998, when Venezuelans elected Ch\u00e1vez, an outspoken critic of neoliberal policies that exacerbate inequality. Ch\u00e1vez oversaw the drafting of a new constitution that redistributed power to the poor and disenfranchised \u2014 even extending social security<\/a> to housewives and formally granting them the status of workers. His progressive agenda and Afro-Indigenous heritage<\/a> alarmed the elite and U.S. officials, who viscerally opposed his reforms and racistly referred to him as a \u201cmonkey.\u201d Increasingly, the State Department regarded Ch\u00e1vez as an obstacle to the liberal consensus \u2014 the blend of open markets, formal democracy and U.S. hegemony \u2014 that policy makers envisioned for the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Seeking his ouster, the George W. Bush administration funneled $3.3 million<\/a> to Venezuelan collaborators in six months, while making \u201cnumerous contacts\u201d with the opposition. In April 2002, aid recipients kidnapped Ch\u00e1vez and installed Pedro Carmona, a prominent businessman. Previously, the U.S. embassy praised Carmona for his \u201ccritical role in advancing U.S. commercial interests,\u201d calling him \u201cthe right man for the right time in Venezuela.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many opposition leaders who are running in the 2023 presidential primaries formerly participated in the coup. The conservative firebrand, Mar\u00eda Corina Machado, signed the decree<\/a> dissolving the government. Henrique Capriles even laid siege to the Cuban embassy<\/a>, as assailants promised to starve the diplomats inside and force them to \u201ceat carpet<\/a>.\u201d Eventually, their colleague, Henry Ramos Allup, dashed the myth that the coup was a spontaneous response to government excesses. \u201cIt\u2019s a lie that the [Carmona] decree fell from the sky,\u201d he explained<\/a>, \u201cwe had all seen it a week before.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ultimately, the coup provoked a mass uprising that immobilized the country, compelling Carmona to flee, restoring Ch\u00e1vez and welding the stigma of treason to the opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over the next decade, chavistas introduced social legislation that slashed poverty rates in half<\/a> and redistributed political power, retaining the devotion of the popular classes and further alienating the elite. Repeatedly, U.S. support emboldened government critics, while unintentionally tarnishing the opposition\u2019s credibility. It also exacerbated a process of political polarization, especially after Ch\u00e1vez embraced socialism in 2005 \u2014 skewering the wealthy with his abrasive rhetoric. Many members of the elite agreed with leading Venezuelan commentator,\u2002Jos\u00e9 Antonio Gil<\/a>, who saw only one solution: \u201cHe has to be killed.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nonetheless, the National Endowment for Democracy, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other U.S. agencies continued channeling millions of dollars to government opponents. In 2009, the embassy listed its main objectives<\/a> as \u201cPenetrating Chavez\u2019 Political Base,\u201d \u201cDividing Chavismo\u201d and \u201cIsolating Chavez Internationally.\u201d By then, U.S. authorities had granted assistance to more than 300 Venezuelan organizations to unite and strengthen dissent \u2014 sponsoring political education initiatives for more than 600,000 participants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet policy makers found the strategy deeply frustrating, repeatedly describing opposition leaders as incompetent. That same year, the embassy fretted<\/a> that their organizations \u201cremain top-heavy and media-focused with little grassroots reach.\u201d Diplomats also reported complaints that opposition party leaders in Un Nuevo Tiempo were \u201conly interested in claiming power for themselves,\u201d while those in Acci\u00f3n Democr\u00e1tica retained control because the \u201cinternal party rules are undemocratic.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n When the opposition revamped its coalition, the Democratic Unity Roundtable, in June 2009, U.S. policy makers noted<\/a> a \u201ctypical display of poor coordination,\u201d suspecting that leaders lacked \u201cthe will to sacrifice personal ambition for the sake of unity.\u201d According to colleagues, the photogenic conservative Leopoldo L\u00f3pez even arrived late at the press conference to draw attention to himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2013, Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s death became a turning point, presenting opponents with a tantalizing opportunity to eject chavismo from power. After Capriles lost the presidential election to Maduro that year, he exhorted supporters to \u201cunload their fury\u201d in the streets, initiating a cycle of violent protests<\/a>. Demonstrators hoped to escalate tensions, making the country ungovernable and compelling Maduro to resign. Machado confided<\/a> that the head of the opposition coalition \u201ctold the State Department that the only way to resolve this [impasse] is by provoking and accentuating a crisis, a coup or a self-coup.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n As falling oil prices throttled Venezuela\u2019s economy, L\u00f3pez \u2014 who colleagues called<\/a> \u201carrogant, vindictive, and power-hungry\u201d \u2014 led \u201cThe Exit,\u201d another wave of protests in 2014 demanding regime change. Participants strung wires to decapitate motorists<\/a> and shot civilians crossing barricades. Despite sympathetic international coverage, the uprising hardly extended beyond the wealthiest pockets of Venezuela, reaching only 19 of 335 municipalities<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Exploiting revelations of opposition ties to the National Endowment for Democracy and USAID, Maduro arrested L\u00f3pez<\/a> and accused President Barack Obama of interventionism. Ironically, the endowment then granted the imprisoned hardliner its \u201cDemocracy Award<\/a>,\u201d and Obama issued an executive order<\/a> declaring that Venezuela posed \u201can unusual and extraordinary threat\u201d in order to tighten economic sanctions. Such gestures energized the opposition, which secured control of the legislature in 2015. In his opening address, National Assembly Speaker Henry Ramos Allup announced measures to remove Maduro within six months. \u201cThese commitments are non-negotiable,\u201d he emphasized<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By then, the U.S. had funded political parties, trade unions, a national referendum and even an anti-Ch\u00e1vez rock festival<\/a>. But U.S. and Venezuelan leaders proved to be toxic allies. Washington mistrusted the chavista left\u2019s radical rhetoric, socialist convictions and utopian aspirations for the region. But rather than undercut chavismo, U.S. policies often discredited the opposition or pushed critics toward uncompromising extremism, exacerbating a multidimensional crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Raw Force<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 2016 election of Donald Trump supercharged tensions, empowering hawkish officials bent on regime change and a fresh crop of \u201cmagazolanos\u201d \u2014 Venezuelans imitating the shrill tone and tactics of the \u201cMake America Great Again\u201d movement. Upon entering office, Trump piled economic sanctions on Venezuela, while meeting with rebel officers<\/a> to discuss a potential coup and advertising a \u201cmilitary option<\/a>.\u201d Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who previously clashed with Ch\u00e1vez while leading ExxonMobil, publicly greenlit intervention<\/a> \u2014 suggesting soldiers could \u201cmanage a peaceful transition.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2018, opposition forces abruptly terminated talks with the Maduro administration while on the verge of an agreement guaranteeing peaceful coexistence. Government officials claimed that Tillerson called the negotiator<\/a>, Julio Borges, convincing him to torpedo the accord \u2014 a charge Borges denies. The main mediator and former Spanish prime minister, Jos\u00e9 Luis Rodr\u00edguez Zapatero, erupted. \u201cI find it shocking that the document was not signed by the opposition representation,\u201d Rodr\u00edguez Zapatero emphasized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tensions culminated on January 23, 2019, when then-National Assembly Speaker Guaid\u00f3 declared himself president, rallying opposition forces against Maduro. U.S. officials quickly recognized his parallel government and ratcheted up pressure. Eyeing Venezuelan oil, Trump portrayed Guaid\u00f3 as a pliant proxy<\/a>, reportedly telling his national security adviser, \u201cI want him to say he will be extremely loyal to the United States and no one else.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet again, opposition leaders mired themselves in controversy, undermining their cause. While administering aid for Guaid\u00f3 that February, the legislator Freddy Superlano apparently brought two women<\/a> to his hotel room, who then drugged and robbed him<\/a>. Later, the anti-chavista newspaper, PanAm Post, published a blistering expos\u00e9<\/a> of opposition corruption, reporting that rebel soldiers spread vice<\/a> in C\u00facuta, Colombia: \u201cProstitutes, alcohol, and violence.\u201d Even worse, Colombian intelligence claimed that Venezuelan leaders managing humanitarian assistance went on a binge \u2014 spending funds on nightclubs, luxury clothing, and other accommodations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As the crisis mounted, TV cameras captured Guaid\u00f3\u2019s deputy, Stalin Gonz\u00e1lez, missing a session of the National Assembly to attend a Major League Baseball game<\/a>. Guaid\u00f3 himself appeared in photographs<\/a> with Colombian drug traffickers. Such scandals prompted Ramos Allup to warn associates<\/a> \u201cto be very careful\u201d to protect information. Privately, he lambasted peers who relied on the U.S., acknowledging in a leaked recording that they \u201cembezzle money from banks here.\u201d He worried they would ruin Venezuela: \u201cThey [have] already fornicated with her enough.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, the Trump administration heightened pressure by weaponizing humanitarian assistance. At one point, officials even tried to force foreign aid across the Colombian border into Venezuela, exploiting the standoff to discredit Maduro. Auditors concluded that such USAID schemes<\/a> \u201cdeviated from humanitarian principles and exceeded risk tolerance,\u201d turning assistance into \u201ca key tool\u201d to \u201cincrease pressure\u201d against the government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Later, the State Department announced plans to divert more than $40 million in aid for Central America to the Venezuelan opposition. \u201cWhat they are doing is essentially taking the money that would help poor Central American children and giving it to pay the salaries of Guaid\u00f3 and his officials,\u201d\u2002a congressional aide explained<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Throughout it all, U.S. and opposition leaders calculated that escalating tensions would prompt the nation\u2019s military officers to intervene. Guaid\u00f3 strenuously denied that he sought a military coup or foreign intervention. Yet on April 30, Guaid\u00f3 and L\u00f3pez tried to incite a military uprising<\/a> near La Carlota air base using Twitter. They claimed that \u201cfew\u201d officers identified with the government, while misleadingly posing outside the base<\/a> \u2014 since forces loyal to Maduro still controlled it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Few heeded their call to arms. Afterward, Guaid\u00f3 announced that he established<\/a> \u201cdirect communications\u201d with the U.S. for military \u201ccoordination.\u201d Cheerleading the intervention,\u2002Machado exhorted Trump<\/a> to level \u201ca real, credible threat, a severe threat, and an imminent threat.\u201d Likewise, the head of U.S. Southern Command, Adm. Craig Fuller, argued that Venezuela occupied<\/a> \u201ca vicious circle of threats\u201d menacing the region. \u201cI look forward to discussing how we can support the \u2026 [leaders of Venezuelan armed forces] who make the right decision,\u201d he pointedly stated<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Eventually, the Guaid\u00f3 government hired the U.S. security contractor<\/a> Silvercorp to invade Venezuela. During the May 2020 offensive, Silvercorp owner Jordan Goudreau released a promotional video announcing the mission, eliminating the element of surprise and bungling the operation<\/a>. After Venezuelan authorities intercepted the mercenaries, the opposition claimed Maduro himself launched the invasion, which observers derisively dubbed the \u201cBay of Little Pigs.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ultimately, the Trump administration\u2019s aggressive posturing encouraged government opponents to abandon the path of legal struggle, substituting raw force for strategy. While strangling the economy, U.S. officials declined to back them with the vaunted military option. Instead, Venezuela slid into catastrophic equilibrium \u2014 split between coup forces seeking power and a government that increasingly lacked it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n War Without Bombs<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although saber-rattling proved ineffectual, a lethal combination of economic sanctions and international pressure still propel a humanitarian crisis. The economists Jeffrey Sachs and Mark Weisbrot estimate that sanctions killed more than 40,000 Venezuelans<\/a> within two years. In October 2021, a United Nations investigation concluded that economic coercion raised the poverty rate<\/a> to 94 percent in 2020 \u2014 freezing foreign assets, blocking export markets and fueling hyperinflation. Its report emphasizes that sanctions \u201cconstitute a violation of international law,\u201d undermining \u201cthe most fundamental rights to life, food, water, health, housing and education.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In effect, Venezuela has become a war zone with almost exclusively civilian casualties. This May, an academic study concluded that the destruction of its oil industry<\/a> \u201cis of a dimension seen only when armies blow up oil fields.\u201d Yet the international press largely overlooks sanctions, and a recent International Monetary Fund report on Venezuela\u2019s economy hardly mentions them<\/a>. Meanwhile, foreign creditors are lobbying U.S. authorities to liquidate CITGO, the Venezuelan government\u2019s largest foreign asset. Their representatives openly encourage judges<\/a> to \u201ctake advantage\u201d of a surge in company revenue to pay off debt-holders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the squeeze, Maduro remains firmly in power. Over the past year, the rise of progressive leaders across the region \u2014 such as President Gustavo Petro in Colombia \u2014 has reduced Venezuela\u2019s isolation. The global energy crisis has equally encouraged countries to improve relations with the oil-rich nation. Once, over 50 countries<\/a> recognized Guaid\u00f3, but the remnants of his parallel government now grasp for legitimacy, even vacating the Venezuelan embassy<\/a> in Washington.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In late May, President Lula da Silva of Brazil warmly welcomed Maduro at a summit for South American leaders, while vocally denouncing sanctions<\/a>. Leading international newspapers such as El Pa\u00eds portrayed the conference as a turning point in the \u201cdiplomatic rehabilitation<\/a>\u201d of his government. Recently, Chile announced plans to send a new ambassador<\/a> to Caracas after years of tension, and UN officials appointed Venezuelans<\/a> to major positions in the General Assembly. Such developments inspired the Venezuelan daily, El Universal, to report this June<\/a> that a great burden \u201cappears to have disappeared: The isolation of the country and his [Maduro\u2019s] government.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n While promoting a thaw in relations, President Joe Biden\u2019s administration maintains sanctions, apparently attempting to foster conditions for an opposition victory in the 2024 presidential election. In a way, the policy is a backhanded tribute to Maduro, whose endurance has encouraged opponents to return to the terrain of electoral combat \u2014 pausing brasher schemes for regime change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As a result, opposition leaders dissolved their parallel government this December. In a desperate bid for relevance, Guaid\u00f3 illegally entered Colombia in April to attend an international conference on Venezuela. Compelling Colombian authorities to expel him, he then accused them of political persecution<\/a> before flying to Miami.<\/p>\n\n\n\n His red-carpet treatment in the U.S. sharply contrasts with the odyssey of refugees that U.S. sanctions have pushed over the border. Over the first four months of Fiscal Year 2023 alone, U.S. authorities reported 65,000 irregular encounters with Venezuelans<\/a> at the southern border. Perversely, Guaid\u00f3 has suggested that sanctions actually stimulate the Venezuelan economy<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although the political balance remains fluid, Guaid\u00f3\u2019s fall from grace symbolizes the failure of U.S. and opposition tactics. Recalibrating policy, President Biden still quietly squeezes Venezuela\u2019s economy, balancing deceptive tact with agonizing pressure. Similarly, the opposition\u2019s strategic pivot to elections \u2014 and current preparations for primaries<\/a> \u2014 reflect a concession to political reality. The outcome of these shifts is unclear. But as the crisis persists, Venezuelans remain victims of the very powerbrokers competing to save them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The author would like to thank Sarah Priscilla Lee of the Learning Sciences Program at Northwestern University for reviewing this article.<\/p>\n\n\n\n